Sepenggal Perjalanan

JAKARTA (JP): For historical reasons, the middle class is often assumed to be the pioneer and champion of sociopolitical reform.

For some countries in Asia, including Indonesia, this assumption does not necessarily hold true.

In Indonesia, the middle class often hinders the wheel of democracy. Most members are apolitical, preferring to maintain the status quo to protect their position, and business.

The development path taken by Indonesia's middle class is different from the one which evolved in the West.

Industrialization grows in Indonesia because of the business players' close proximity to the power elite. Indonesian capitalists grow by protection, Licenses and privileges, and are never subjected to competitive forces.

Mohammad A.S. Hikam defines one paradox of the middle class: it cannot solve its cultural problems. The middle class is divided into native and non-native, Moslem and non-Moslem, and Javanese and non-Javanese.

These divisions sowed primordialism, which is hardly conducive to the development of a civil society. Primordialistic forces also prevent the middle class from breaking dependence on the power elite.

Hikam highlights another civil society paradox in the growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs has undoubtedly proliferated. But instead of turning their potency to the growth of civil society, many NGOS acted more as development consultants.

What about the intellectual community?

Hikam says intellectual life in Indonesia is experiencing a very long summer. II is almost devoid of alternative thoughts. Most intellectuals also feel safe if they are close to the power centers. In short, they are becoming bureaucratic intellectuals.

They hide behind the pretext that social transformation is more effective if they work through the inner circle. This is tragic if compared to intellectuals during the former era of Soewardy Soeryaningrat, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Moh. Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir and Sukarno.

What about. The press? Civil society is founded upon a free public capacity, and the press has a major role to play. The press industry in Indonesia has grown immensely under the New Order, but it still faces a paradoxical and complex situation.-The press licensing requirement is a constraint to its role. Hikam defines civil society as voluntary and highly independent organized social movements. In Indonesia, civil society functions as a pressure group and aggregate group.

Unfortunately, the close knit political system provides little opportunity for pressure groups to operate effectively.

It is a zero-sum game in which civil society is powerless in the face of an omnipotent government. It is also a game in which the bureaucracy controls the national development and keeps public participation to the minimum, except for mobilization to give legitimacy to those in power.

Such a system relies on forces that can mobilize the masses to support national development. It does not need pressure groups to help articulate and compile society's needs.

Hikam's book is pessimistic but it should not dampen our spirit. There are still democratic forces at work in Indonesia.

The banning of Tempo Editor and Detik magazines led to the alternative press like
The publications by the Alliance of Independent Journalists the Institute of the Study of Information Flow, and Tempo Interaktif.

The removal of former Indonesian Democratic Party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri as a symbol of grass-root politics has also awakened a more lasting undercurrent opposition forces.

There is also the establishment of new groups like PRD, PUDI, MARI, and KIPP to challenge the current political system.

Thus, the symptoms that Hikam talks about are not totally negative. They may turn out to be useful investments for the future democracy. Without these incidents, the democratization process in Indonesia would have remained static.

Going by the adage "power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely" is good for the political education of the people.

This book contains 11 articles about grass-root politics, government hegemony and the democratization process. It takes the writer further from his doctoral thesis, The State, Grass roots Politics, and Civil Society a Study of Social Movement under Indonesia's New Order in the Political Department of the University of Hawaii.

It shows Hikam is not a one work wonder, and has not fallen into the trap of bureaucratic intellectualism.

Archives The Jakarta Post, Thursday, June 10, 1999

Money Politics Burdens Democratization
by Prih Adiartanto

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Money used as a means to gain political power is not a new practice. Nicolo Machiavelli once stated that any way can be used to get power. "The buck stops here", said former U.S. president Harry Truman. Even the president seat in U.S. can cost US$70 million to $80 million.

In Indonesia, the Lippogate/Riadygate incident was a turning point for money politics discussions. Other cases which come to mind are the abasement of Jamsostek (workers insurance) funds in the discussion of the Manpower Law; Golkar's congress; the massacre of dukun santet (suspected shamans) in East Java; and the mobilization of a militia.

These are what Indra Ismawan mentions as the prologue to this book. The phenomena of money politics is like an iceberg. Why? From the spreading discourse, money politics has not been perfectly profiled. The demarcation line between money politics and political financing is still very vague.

Even Law No. 2/1999 on political parties does not talk about money politics. If there are rules about the source of a political party's funds,what is discussed is the stream of the funds from the donor. Ismawan statesthat such rules are only effective for the new parties, which are still mobilizing funds. What about the established parties that are already rich?This condition gives the parties the opportunity to hand over funds to the voters in order to get the political benefit.
There are different ideas about the meaning of money politics, which makes it difficult for the public to judge the maneuver of the groups. On the other hand, it becomes easy for the political actors to make justification. Ironically, the justification made by a player of money politics is hard to verify, or at least to clarify, to reveal the real substance of the problem.

For a time, this problem will keep growing in a value system which justifies the hidden practice of money politics. Hidden or not, money politics is a dangerous virus for democratization.

Ismawan defines money politics as every effort or action plan that uses money with a political motive (every action that uses money convertibility), in order to influence the receiver to do or not to do someaction for the sake of the giver.

This transaction has the potential to raise a distortion to the pureness of political process and to blur the essence of democracy.

Money politics on a national scale is a reproduction of events in a smaller and more limited scope. At the grass roots of democratization, likethe election of a village chief, money politics largely expands. As it happens all the time, it is considered normal and people are no longer aware of its danger.

Money politics which is committed institutionally rather than individually, is as dangerous as violent intimidation. It is even more systematic and well camouflaged.

A floating-mass politics which eliminates individual loyalty to a political party is a precondition of money politics. Corruption as a social-cultural structure which has been well-tended since the colonial erais also a significant precondition of money politics. Thus, money politics is, indeed, inherent to the corruptive-culture.

An increase in the "absolute poverty number" opens possibilities to commit money politics. A rich party will play Santa Claus to the poor and get community sympathy. The handover of social safety net funds is presumedas a camouflage of money politics.

According to the process, money politics in elections is divided into twofund streams. First, funds flow from donor to party. What often happens is that the donor, in return, demands privileges, consensus or any other economic benefit from the party.

Second, funds flow from party to voters. The motive behind this is trading of voters' right.

Loyalty and volatility of the party mass are also important factors to know whether money politics is increasing or decreasing. It is assumed thatmoney politics cannot flourish in a loyal mass. In reverse, money politics will flourish in a volatile mass.

What has been happening in Indonesia since 1998 is a turn from loyalty tovolatility of the mass. There is disequilibrium as a result of a growth of new parties. The effect which is instantly seen is a decrease of traditional voters' loyalty. In such conditions, a single majority no longer exists.

When the money politics discussion is taken as a destructive potency, there is an early warning. It comes from the fact that there is always a certain party that uses its power, including money, to win the political competition.

The danger of money politics can be eliminated through a voters' education program. This program can also create a group of election monitors at the grass roots.

Any action to eliminate money politics, in the long-term, should have a built-in corruption sweeping program. This is related to the fact that money politics is always part of corruption, collusion and nepotism, which are inherited from the New Order.

This book is five-chapter compilation of articles and columns. Despite its unsystematic plot, the book could become a discourse of education process related to the 1999 general election.